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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model with multiple steady states (low tax and low unemployment
versus high tax and high unemployment) in which equilibrium selection is not conditioned on a
sunspot variable. Instead, large temporary shocks initiate unavoidable transitions from one steady
state to another. Tax policies have huge effects in some cases. In particular, it is possible that the
transition to the high-unemployment steady state after a negative shock can be avoided if the
government borrows to finance unemployment benefits, and in some cases it is even possible that a
credible permanent tax cut would force the economy out of the high-unemployment steady state. The
model is used to explain the high European unemployment rates in the 80’s and 90’s. The paper
argues that the increase in unemployment during the 70’s played a key role because it led to an
increase in the obligation to pay unemployment benefits. The implied tax burden was so big that the
transition to the high-unemployment regime was the unique equilibrium outcome.
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Models with both a high-activity and a low-activity steady-state equilibrium that
are sustained by macroeconomic complementarities have played an important role in
modern macroeconomics. Exemplary papers that model this idea are Bryant (1983)
and Cooper and John (1988). A drawback of this literature is that in a dynamic
framework the switching between the two regimes is typically conditioned on a
sunspot variable. Relying on sunspot variables is undesirable because they are hard
to identify and the sign of the eﬀect of the sunspot variable is indeterminate.1 This
paper contributes to this literature by providing a framework in which temporary
changes in productivity, through its eﬀect on the stock of unemployed, control the
dynamics of the system. In particular, temporary shocks can induce an inevitable
transition from one steady state to another.2
In this paper we develop a labor market matching model with a low and a
high-unemployment steady state. Matching models are ideally suited to embed the
multiplicity idea in a dynamic framework because they carefully model the transi-
tion from unemployment to employment as well as the transition from employment
to either unemployment or to employment at a diﬀerent productivity level. The rea-
son for the multiplicity is very simple. In one steady-state, unemployment rates are
low and, consequently the government’s obligations to pay unemployment beneﬁts
are low. This implies a low tax burden. Low tax rates correspond to low breakup
margins of existing jobs, low rejection margins of new jobs, and indeed a low un-
employment rate. In the other steady-state, high tax rates imply high breakup and
rejection margins and, thus, high unemployment rates. We will show that it is pos-
s i b l et h a tb o t hs t e a d ys t a t e sa r eu n i q u ec o n t i n u a t i o ne q u i l i b r i ai nt h es e n s et h a tt h e
belief to move to the other steady state is not self-fulﬁlling.
If steady states are unique continuation equilibria, then the economy will con-
verge back to the original steady state after a small shock. If the shock is large
enough, however, this is not the case. The idea is the following. Suppose the econ-
omy is in the low-unemployment steady state and in response to a one-time negative
shock there is a wave of job destruction and an increase in the unemployment rate.
Because of the matching friction unemployment will be high in some of the ensuing
time periods as well. The increase in the number of unemployed would increase
the liability of the government to pay beneﬁts even if the economy would converge
1For example, in a model in which nominal money surprises have no or little eﬀect, they still
could serve as a sunspot variable such that a positive monetary surprise shock has a positive eﬀect
on output. In general, however, an equally valid solution is the one where a positive monetary
surprise has a negative eﬀect on output. See Farmer (1997).
2In Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2002), the number of relationships serves a similar role,
that is, a large enough decline in the number of relationships necessarily leads to a total collapse.
2back to the good steady state, that is, even if future job creation and job destruc-
tion decisions are not aﬀected. If the increase in the number of unemployed and
the magnitude of unemployment beneﬁts are high enough, however, the implied in-
crease in tax rates does lead to an increase in the destruction rate of continuing
relationships and an increase in the rejection rate of new matches. In other words,
tax rates are too high for them not to aﬀect job creation and job destruction. Con-
sequently, the economy cannot convergence back towards the low-unemployment
steady state and it has to converge towards the high-unemployment steady state.
For intermediate shocks multiple equilibrium time paths are possible and the econ-
omy could either converge back to the low-unemployment steady state or converge
to the high-unemployment steady state.
Transitions are not symmetric and in general it will be harder to switch to the
low-unemployment steady state than to switch to the high-unemployment steady
state. One reason is that relationships can be instantaneously terminated but cre-
ation of new relationships takes time. In addition, because matching takes time, the
decrease in the discounted value of the government’s promise to pay unemployment
beneﬁts when a positive shock occurs (after which the unemployment rate decreases
gradually) will be smaller than the increase in the discounted value of the govern-
ment’s promise when a negative shock occurs (after which the unemployment rate
increases instantaneously).
The paper also analyzes the importance of ﬁscal policy and in particular the ef-
fects of substituting debt for taxes to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts.3 Consider the
case where the economy is in the high-unemployment steady state and unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced out of current-period taxes. Also, suppose that staying
in the steady state is the unique continuation equilibrium under this tax policy.
To understand why this could be the unique equilibrium time path suppose to the
contrary that the rejection rate of newly matched pairs and the destruction rate are
equal to zero and the economy will, thus, converge towards the low-unemployment
steady state. Along the transition path unemployment and tax rates decrease, but
because of the matching friction this process will take time. If the initial reduc-
tion in tax rates is not large enough then a zero rejection rate for new job oﬀers
would not be consistent with optimizing behavior and the described path with zero
rejections would, thus, not be an equilibrium outcome. If the government starts
out with a larger tax reduction, however, and initially ﬁnances transfers to the un-
employed by issuing debt then the transition out of the high-unemployment steady
3The model does not satisfy Ricardian Equivalence because productive income and unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are taxed at diﬀerent rates and the comparison of current and future after-tax income
from a productive relationship with current and expected unemployment beneﬁts is key for the job
d e s t r u c t i o na n dj o bc r e a t i o nd e c i s i o n .
3state could−at least in some cases−be an equilibrium.4 Moreover, we will argue
that if the tax cut is credible, then this transition out of the high-unemployment
steady state would be the unique time path. Similarly, ﬁscal policy plays a key role
in determining whether the economy can converge back to the low-unemployment
steady state after a negative shock. In standard models, changes in tax rates only
have big eﬀects if supply elasticities have unrealistically large values. Here tax rates
aﬀect the breakup and rejection decision, however, and the eﬀects are big if the mass
of marginal jobs is big.
This paper is related to Morris and Shin (2000). In this paper the authors
modify a model on bank runs with a low-withdrawal and a high-withdrawal steady
state, such that the outcome is uniquely determined by the value of the funda-
mental variable.5 There is still a sense of having two regimes because the fraction
of withdrawals is a discontinuous function of the fundamental state variable. In
contrast, in this paper there still are two steady-state equilibria in which all fun-
damental exogenous variables have the same values. The time paths, however, are
typically (but not always) unique. Whether the economy is on a time path towards
the low-unemployment or the high-unemployment steady state is determined by the
m a g n i t u d eo ft h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n d ,t h u s ,b yc u r r e n tand past realizations of
the fundamental variables.
We show that the model can be used to explain the high European unemploy-
ment rates in the last two decades. During the 1950’s and 1960’s, the unemployment
rate in both Europe and the U.S. was on average below ﬁve percent and was in the
U.S. somewhat higher than in Europe. In response to steep increases in oil prices
unemployment increased sharply during the 1970’s on both continents. In Europe
unemployment rates remained high in the two following decades, while in the U.S.
they returned to their earlier low levels. The divergent behavior has been termed
the “European unemployment puzzle”. Obviously, a variety of institutional fac-
tors distinguishes Europe from the U.S., including strong unions, minimum wages,
generous unemployment beneﬁts, and high employment protection. These institu-
tional distinctions cannot by themselves explain the diﬀerences in unemployment
rates observed during the last two decades since they have been present through-
out the postwar era. Several recent papers explain the European unemployment
puzzle with models in which unemployment rates remain low in the presence of
“employment-unfriendly” institutions as long as economic conditions are good but
4We will see that it is also possible that the present value of all the unemployment beneﬁts
the government has to ﬁnance during the transition is so high that there is no feasible deﬁcit
management for which transition out of the high-unemployment steady state is an equilibrium.
5The authors study a model with patient and impatient consumers that have to determine
wether or not to withdraw time deposits.
4in which they increase if conditions deteriorate.6 In contrast, in countries with
“employment-friendly” institutions the unemployment rate remains low if economic
conditions deteriorate. Similarly, in this paper the high-unemployment steady state
does not exist if the replacement rate (i.e., the level of unemployment beneﬁts to the
predisplacement wage level) is low. In this paper the wedge between taxes on pro-
ductive income and unemployment beneﬁts increases when the economy moves from
the low-unemployment steady state to the high-unemployment steady state. This is
exactly the deterioration in economic conditions used in Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
to explain the European unemployment puzzle using both an empirical analysis and
a theoretical model. Although similar in spirit, this paper distinguishes itself from
the literature in two important aspects. First, the long-term changes predicted by
the model proposed here are not in response to an unexplained change in an exoge-
nous variable,7 but are the endogenous response to a temporary shock. Second, in
this paper the 1970’s play a key role in the explanation of the behavior of European
unemployment rates in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In particular, in the proposed model
a large enough increase in the number of unemployed, such as the increase observed
during the 1970’s necessarily leads to a new steady-state with high unemployment.
This paper provides a formal model of the view in Lindbeck (1996) that “... once
high unemployment has emerged, basic structures and mechanisms in West European
societies tend to perpetuate it.”
An explanation of the high European unemployment rates in the last two decades
without assigning a role to the severe recession of the 1970’s seems unsatisfactory,
since European unemployment rates reached their extraordinarily high levels during
the 1970’s. One wonders whether the deep downturn in the 1970’s simply delivered
a shock to the European economic system from which it couldn’t automatically
recover. Most economists would agree that monetary policy and/or the increases
in oil prices are key in explaining the behavior of real activity during the 1970’s;
the economic downturn during this decade cannot be explained solely by long-term
6Diﬀerent candidates for the exogenous change in the economic environment are given in the
literature. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) consider a long-term rise in economic turbulence, mani-
fested in greater skill loss for displaced workers; Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) consider skill-biased
technology improvements; Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) consider an increase in the variability
of idiosyncratic productivity shocks; Daveri and Tabellini (2000) consider an increase in the tax
wedge between labor income and unemployment beneﬁts; Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2000)
consider a long-term increase in embodied productivity; and Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2001)
consider a long-term rise in real interest rates, an increase in tax rates, and a decrease in the growth
rate of disembodied total-factor-productivity.
7This is not supposed to mean that (exogenous) changes in, for example, TFP growth rates did
not occur and are not part of the explanation to the European unemployment puzzle. To simplify
the discussion, however, these eﬀects are not included in the model.
5changes in the factors proposed in the literature. Of course, this argument doesn’t
refute the possibility that these long-term changes in the economic environment just
happened to take eﬀect around a period of prolonged economic downturn and if so
it deﬁnitely seems plausible that the recession sped up the transition to the new
steady state. Another possibility is that the events in this turbulent decade were in
itself instrumental in bringing about long-term changes. For example, the increase
in oil prices led in many countries to inﬂationary policies which later in the decade
were followed by stringent contractionary policies. It seems sensible to assume that
the resulting increase in inﬂationary uncertainty pushed real interest rates higher,
which worsens economic conditions, although one wonders why the eﬀect would be
so persistent. Also, if diﬀerent industry sectors have diﬀerent TFP growth rates
then the substitution processes observed after the increases in the oil price may very
well have changed aggregate TFP growth rates. At best, however, the cited studies
are incomplete by treating the 1950’s and 1960’s as one steady state, the 1980’s
and 1990’s as another steady state, and ignoring the experience of the 1970’s. The
view expressed in this paper is that we are missing some essential elements of the
solution to the puzzle if one simply views the 1970’s as the transition phase from
one steady-state to another.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the benchmark
model. Section 3 discusses the steady states, and Section 4 considers the response
of the economy to small and large temporary shocks. In Section 5 we describe the
European unemployment puzzle and argue that the explanation given in this paper
ﬁts the data well.
2M o d e l
The model used in this paper is a job market matching model similar to the one devel-
oped in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In Section 2.1 we describe the productive
relationship between a worker and an entrepreneur, in Section 2.2 we describe the
matching market, in Section 2.3 we deﬁne the surplus, in Section 2.4 we describe
ﬁscal policy, and in Section 2.5 we give the equilibrium conditions. In Section 2.6,
we introduce a version of the model with creation and destruction costs.
2.1 Employment Relationships
Production takes place within employment relationships consisting of one worker and
one ﬁrm, who interact through discrete time until the relationship is severed. In this
economy there are low-productivity relationships with low-skilled workers and high-
productivity jobs with high-skilled workers. To simplify the model the skill level
6of a worker is given at birth and ﬁxed throughout the worker’s life. A relationship
produces output z per period, where z is a stochastic variable and the three possible
realizations for z satisfy zl,1 <z l,2 <z h. Low-productivity relationships can only
attain values of zl,1 and zl,2 a n dw h e ns u c har e l a t i o n s h i pi sﬁrst formed, an initial
value equal to z is drawn with probability pn(z). For ongoing low-productivity
relationships the probability that next period’s value of z is equal to zl,j when the
current value of z is given by zl,i is given by the transition function p(zl,j|zl,i) with
i,j ∈ {1,2}. New and continuing relationships with a high-skilled worker always
produce zh.
Both types of relationships may experience an exogenous breakup that occurs
with probability ρx
l for low-skilled workers and with probability ρx
h for high-skilled
workers. Exogenous breakups reﬂect events that permanently destroy the produc-
tivity of the relationship, e.g., market conditions may shift adversely. Alternatively,
exogenous breakups can capture changes in workers’ personal circumstances that
lead them to change jobs. Assume that exogenous separations cannot occur in the
period that a relationship is newly formed. After the current-period productivity
parameter is determined, the worker and ﬁrm decide whether to continue or sever
their relationship. If the worker and ﬁrm agree to sever their relationship following
a switch, or if exogenous separation occurs, then they each enter a matching market
in which new employment relationships are formed. In addition, workers and en-
trepreneurs are subject to shocks that induce retirement, occurring at the end of a
period. Let ρr denote the probability of retirement. For simplicity we assume that
a retirement shock hits both partners in the relationship simultaneously. A retiring
agent leaves the labor market and obtains a future value of zero.
2.2 Matching Market
New employment relationships are formed on a matching market. In our model there
are low and high-productivity workers and entrepreneurs with projects for either low-
productivity or high-productivity workers.8 We assume that low-productivity and
high-productivity workers ﬁnd jobs on separate matching markets and there is a unit
mass of workers and a unit mass of entrepreneurs. The fraction of low-productivity
workers in the labor force φ, is equal to the fraction of low-productivity projects.
Whether a worker has low or high productivity is determined at birth and cannot
be changed. These assumptions imply that in both matching markets the ratio of
the mass of unemployed to the mass of vacancies is constant. This together with the
assumption of a homogeneous of degree one matching function implies ﬁxed match-
8For simplicity we assume that low-productivity workers are not productive in a high-
productivity project and vice versa.
7ing probabilities. For low-productivity workers the matching probability is denoted
by λl and for the high-productivity workers by λh. Each period, a proportion ρr
of the workers leaves the labor force through retirement, replaced by an identical
number of new entrants that ﬂow into the unemployment pool.9 Further, estab-
lished workers enter the unemployment pool when their employment relationships
are severed. While they are unemployed, workers receive unemployment beneﬁts
equal to rk and a not-taxable beneﬁt representing the disutility of working equal to
bk,w i t hk ∈ {l,h}.
2.3 Surplus Level
A worker and entrepreneur in an ongoing relationship choose to continue their re-
lationship if the value of z is suﬃciently high. We assume that the value of zh is
suﬃciently high so that high-productivity jobs are never severed. The worker and
ﬁrm bargain eﬃciently over the terms of their relationship, and thus they make
acceptance and continuation decisions that maximize their joint surplus. The joint
surplus for a low-productivity job can be written as





for z equal to zl,1 and zl,2.H e r eτe,t(x) is the tax rate on productive income equal to
x in period t and τu,t(x) is the tax rate on unemployment beneﬁts equal to x, gl,t(z)
denotes the future joint value from continuing the relationship when the current pro-
ductivity level is equal to z, ww
l,t denotes the low-productivity worker’s discounted
future beneﬁts from entering the unemployment pool in the current period, and w
f
l,t
denotes the low-productivity entrepreneur’s discounted future beneﬁts from enter-







h,t are indexed by t to indicate their dependence on the cur-
rent and expected future distribution of agents over the diﬀerent employment and
unemployment categories.10
In equilibrium, sl,t(z) is an increasing function of z,11 and there exists a cutoﬀ
level, zl,t, such that relationships with a value of z bigger than or equal to zl,t have
a non-negative surplus and, thus, continue the relationship, while relationships with
a value of z less than zl,t have a negative surplus and break up. The cutoﬀ level is
9Af r a c t i o nφ of all new borns have low-productivity skills.






h,t only depend on current and future
tax rates but depend on characteristics of the cross-sectional distribution because τe,t(z) and τu,t(b)
do.
11At least when the tax policy is such that (1 − τe(z))z is increasing in z.
8the level of z at which the surplus inclusive of destruction costs, sl,t(z),i se q u a lt o
zero. Thus,
sl,t(zl,t)=0 . (2)
If there are no costs to destroy or create a match, the cutoﬀ level for newly matched
relationships is also equal to zl,t. Analogous equations can be written down for the
cutoﬀ level for high-productivity relationships, zh,t,b u tt h e s ea r en o tt h a ti n t e r e s t i n g
since we assume that zh is always bigger than zh,t.
2.4 Fiscal Policy
Throughout the paper we assume that tax rates on productive income are equal for
all agents (that is, τe,t(z)=τt), and that the tax rate on unemployment beneﬁts
is equal to ψτt,w h e r eψ h a sav a l u el e s st h a no n et oc a p t u r et h ee m p i r i c a lf a c t
that tax rates on beneﬁts are lower than those on productive income.12 We will
consider two opposite extreme cases on how the government chooses debt and tax
rates to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts. Under the ﬁrst policy the government only
uses current tax revenues to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts, which means that the









 = gov +( 1− ψτt)[rlul,t + rhuh,t], (3)
where gov is the level of per capital government expenditures which is assumed ﬁxed,
el,j,t denotes the mass of employed workers with productivity level zl,j, j ∈ {1,2} in
period t, eh,t denotes the mass of employed high-productivity workers, ul,t denotes
the mass of low-skilled unemployed workers, and uh,t denotes the mass of high-skilled
unemployed workers. We will refer to this policy as the balanced-budget ﬁscal policy.
We also consider the ﬁscal policy where the government sets a constant tax rate,
τt = τ, such that the present value of current and future tax revenues is equal to the
present value of current and future transfers to the unemployed plus the amount of












t+k−1 [gov +( 1− ψτ)(rlul,t+k + rhuh,t+k)],
(4)
where dt is the amount of outstanding government debt at the beginning of period t.
We will refer to this policy as the balanced-NPV policy. Under both the balanced-
budget and the balanced-NPV policy, the government sets tax rates taking the level
12See Section 5 below.
9of unemployment beneﬁts and government expenditures as well as the expectations
of the agents as given and we will, therefore, refer to these as passive policies.
We will compare those with a ﬁscal policy in which the government commits to a
sequence of tax rates. Under this policy theg o v e r n m e n te x p e n d i t u r e sw i l la d j u s t ,
if necessary, to satisfy 4. We will refer to this ﬁscal policy as the ﬁscal policy with
credible commitment.
2.5 Equilibrium







steady-state conditions for the distribution over the diﬀerent employment and pro-
















for z equal to zl,1 and zl,2.H e r eIzl,t(z) is an indicator function with a value equal
t o1i fz ≥ zl,t and a value equal to 0 otherwise. Similarly,










The continuation values for low-productivity workers and entrepreneurs with low-
productivity projects leaving the current period in the matching market satisfy
w
w































Similarly, the continuation values for the high-productivity workers and entrepre-
neurs are equal to
w
w
h,t = β(1 − ρ
r)
h







h,t = β(1 − ρ
r)
hn





Here π is the bargaining weight of the worker and λl and λh are the matching
probabilities for the low-productivity and the high-productivity workers (and entre-
preneurs) respectively.
10The equations determining the law of motion of the unemployment rate and
distribution over the diﬀerent productivity levels are straightforward but somewhat
tedious. We, therefore, only give the equations to determine steady-state levels. The
following ﬁve equations can be used to solve for the steady-state values of ul, uh,
el,1, el,2,a n deh.A ne q u a lﬂow of workers into and out of the matching markets for
low-productivity workers requires
φρr +( 1− ρr)ρx(el,1 + el,2)+




j=1(1 − Izl(zl,j))p(zl,j|zl,i)el,i = h






An equal ﬂow into and out of the matching market for high-productivity workers
requires
(1 − φ)ρ
r +( 1− ρ
r)ρ
xeh =[ ρ
r +( 1− ρ
r)λh]uh. (12)
An equal ﬂow of workers into and out of relationships with productivity level zl,1
requires
(1 − ρr)λlIzl(zl,1)pn(zl,1)ul +( 1− ρr)(1 − ρx)Izl(zl,1)p(zl,1|zl,2)el,2 =
[ρr +( 1− ρr)ρx +( 1− ρr)(1 − ρx)p(zl,2|zl,1)]el,1. (13)
An equal ﬂow of workers into and out of relationships with productivity level zl,2
requires
(1 − ρr)λlIzl(zl,2)pn(zl,2)ul +( 1− ρr)(1 − ρx)Izl(zl,2)p(zl,2|zl,1)el,1 =
[ρr +( 1− ρr)ρx +( 1− ρr)(1 − ρx)p(zl,1|zl,2)]el,2. (14)








In this section we introduce destruction and creation costs. Of course there is
an empirical motivation to include these costs; creation of a new job obviously
requires some setup costs and in Europe there are nontrivial costs associated with
the elimination of positions. If these costs are substantial then it seems like a
bad idea to ignore them in a paper that focuses on transitions between steady
states. For example, in a steady state destruction costs are not important but during
the transition from the low-unemployment steady state to the high-unemployment
steady state they obviously are important. Similarly, during the transition out of the
11high-unemployment equilibrium creation costs play a crucial role. In the presence of
these types of costs the surplus of a continuing match, so(z),d i ﬀers from the surplus
of a newly created match, sn(z).I np a r t i c u l a r ,
s
o







des stands for the destruction costs. Similarly,
s
n







cre stands for the creation costs.
3 Steady states
In Section 3.1, we discuss the properties of the two steady states. In Section 3.2, we
address whether a change in agents’ expectations without an accompanying change
in a fundamental variable can drive the economy out of a steady state. We will ﬁnd
that this may depend on the type of ﬁscal policy implemented.13 If a change in
expectations by itself cannot drive the economy out of the steady state then we say
that staying in the steady state is the unique continuation equilibrium. In the ﬁrst
two subsections ﬁscal policy is passive and the government takes the expectations
of the private sector as given when it sets tax rates. In Section 3.3 we consider a
tax policy where the government moves ﬁrst and commits to a particular tax rate.
3.1 Properties of the two steady states
Table 1 reports the three sets of parameter values used in the numerical examples.
To understand the discussion below note that we always assume that all newly
created low-productivity matches start at z1,t h a ti s ,pn(z2)=0 . Motivation for
this choice and other key parameter values will be given below. Also, for all three
sets of parameter values, we keep the parameters that determine steady-state values
of the tax rates and unemployment rates the same. In particular, the two steady
states always have the following properties. In both the low-unemployment and the
high-unemployment steady state there is some unemployment due to the entrance
of new workers and exogenous job destruction. In the low-unemployment regime
this is the only source of unemployment. In the high-unemployment regime the
13That is, this model does not satisfy Ricardian Equivalence. This is not surprising given that
productive income is taxed at a diﬀerent rate than unemployment beneﬁts and the non-monetary
beneﬁto fu n e m p l o y m e n ti sn o tt a x e da ta l l .
12low-productivity jobs have a negative surplus so no low-productivity workers are
employed. For the low-unemployment regime to be an equilibrium it is necessary
that the surplus of all relationships be positive. For the high-unemployment regime
to be an equilibrium it is suﬃcient that the surplus of newly created low-productivity
relationships, i.e., sl(zl,1) is negative (and the surplus of the high productivity rela-
tionships is positive). It is easy to ﬁnd parameter values such that the model has
these two steady-state equilibria. Table 2 documents the unemployment rates and
tax rates for the example used in this paper. The unemployment rates are equal
to 4.7% and 13.5% in the low-unemployment and high-unemployment steady state,
respectively. This substantial increase in the unemployment rate corresponds to an
increase in the tax rate from 29.9 to 35.5 per cent. An increase in the tax rate of 5.6
percentage points, while not humongous, is high enough to drive the marginal jobs
out of existence. There are two reasons for this increase in the tax rate. The ﬁrst
is an increase in total transfers to the unemployed, which is responsible for roughly
3.8 percentage points. But even if total transfers would have remained the same
there would have been an increase in the tax rate since total productive income has
been reduced, so a higher tax rate is needed for the same amount of government
expenditures.
3.2 Unique continuation equilibrium
In this section we address the question of whether the steady-state equilibria de-
scribed above are unique continuation equilibria. We start in section 3.2.1 by dis-
cussing the properties of the model that aﬀect the answer to this question. Par-
ticularly important is ﬁscal policy, and in section 3.2.2 we discuss in more detail
whether staying in the steady state is the unique continuation equilibrium under
passive ﬁscal policies.
3.2.1 Properties that aﬀect uniqueness of equilibrium
This section will focus on examples in which staying in the steady state is a unique
continuation equilibrium under at least one type of passive ﬁscal policy. It might,
therefore, be worthwhile to point out that it is also possible to construct examples
in which staying in the steady states is not a unique continuation equilibrium under
either ﬁscal policy. This is easier to do for the low than for the high-unemployment
steady state, since the destruction of jobs is instantaneous but the creation of jobs
takes time. Suppose that the parameter values are such that the surplus values
at both low-productivity levels are negative in the high-unemployment regime and
positive in the low-unemployment regime. In this case the low-unemployment steady
13state is not the unique continuation equilibrium. To see why, suppose the system
i si nt h el o w - u n e m p l o y m e n ts t e a d ys t a t e ,b u ta l la g e n t se x p e c tt om o v et ot h e
high-unemployment steady state. Then all low-productivity relationships will break
up in the current period and the system will switch instantaneously to the high-
unemployment steady state.
There are several ways one can construct examples in which expectations by
themselves cannot force the system out of the existing steady state. To rule out
the instantaneous shift to the high-unemployment steady state described above, we
assume an upward drift in productivity values. In particular, it is assumed that
all newly matched low-productivity relationships start at the lowest productivity
level, zl,1. Having an upward drift is desirable in itself since Den Haan, Ramey, and
W a t s o n( 2 0 0 0 b )s h o wt h a tm o d e l sw i t ha nu p w a r dd r i f ti np r o d u c t i v i t yc a nr e p l i c a t e
observed data on wages of displaced workers while models with a downward drift or
no drift cannot.
This assumption is important for considering whether staying in the steady state
is the unique continuation equilibrium. In the low-unemployment regime, the en-
dogenous destruction and rejection rates are zero, which means that the tax rates
are low, which in turn implies that the surpluses at all three productivity levels are
positive. In our upward-drift example, with zl,1 <z l,2, the parameter values are such
that that sl(zl,1) < 0 <s l(zl,2) in the high-unemployment steady state. Although
sl(zl,2) > 0, no jobs will operate at z = zl,2 in the high-unemployment steady state
since all low-productivity pairs have to start at zl,1 and these jobs are not created.
Now suppose that the economy is in the low-unemployment steady state and agents
expect to be moving towards the high-unemployment steady state. Even when the
high-unemployment steady-state has been reached the surplus at zl,2 is positive, so
the expectation the economy will move to the high-unemployment steady state will
not make sl (zl,2) negative and relationships with a productivity level equal to zl,2
will, thus, not choose to break up. This means that the convergence towards the
high-unemployment steady state will be slow. The slow convergence implies a slow
increase in the unemployment rate and if the corresponding increase in the tax bur-
den is not severe enough then sl(z1) will−at least initially−remain positive, which
is inconsistent with the agents’ expectations that the economy is moving towards a
high-unemployment steady state.
This example hopefully also makes clear that ﬁscal policy and the discount rate
are also important for considering whether staying in the steady state is the unique
continuation equilibrium. For example, if the discount factor is relatively high, then
the belief that the economy is going downhill will lead to a larger decrease in the
continuation value of staying in a relationship and, thus, to a larger drop in the
surplus. In the next subsection we discuss ﬁscal policy in more detail. Finally, by
14introducing destruction costs or creation costs it becomes more likely that staying
in the steady state is the unique continuation equilibrium.
3.2.2 Uniqueness under alternative passive ﬁscal policies
A steady state is more likely to be the unique continuation equilibrium under the
balanced-ﬁscal policy than under the NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy. The reason is
that if the government implements a balanced-NPV ﬁscal policy then it sets tax
rates according to the expectations of the private sector, thereby reinforcing these
expectations. The diﬀerence between the two ﬁscal policies becomes clear if we look
at the implied tax rates if agents believe the economy will move out of the high-
unemployment steady state towards the low-unemployment steady state. The time
paths for tax rates under the two policies are plotted in Figure 1 for the parameter
set with the low discount rate and no destruction or creation costs. Because of
the matching friction, unemployment rates decline slowly, which under a balanced-
budget ﬁscal policy translates into tax rates that decrease slowly. In fact, just after
the transition the tax rates are still so high that the surplus of newly created matches
is still negative.14 Under the NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy, the government sets the
tax rate such that the present value of tax revenues equals the present value of
government expenditures where both are calculated using the beliefs of the private
sector. This implies an immediate and substantial reduction in the tax rate from
29.1% to 24.5%. Since the unemployment rate hasn’t gone down yet this also implies
an increase in the government’s budget deﬁcit. But it is worth it because under this
ﬁscal policy, moving to the low-unemployment steady state is an equilibrium.15
We will now discuss in more detail how to check whether a steady state is a unique
continuation equilibrium. For a steady state to be an equilibrium you need that the
sign of the surplus is consistent with the creation and destruction decision used
to construct the steady state. For example, the high-unemployment steady state
requires that the surplus of newly created low-productivity matches, sl(zl,1) < 0,
so that indeed no low-productive matches are operating. Suppose that at t =0
the economy is in the high-unemployment steady state. If there is an equilibrium
time path for which the economy does not stay in the high-unemployment steady
state, then it must be the case that in period t =1the surplus of newly created
low-productivity matches, sl,1(zl,1) ≥ 0. Showing that staying in a steady state is a
14This is the reason why staying in the steady state is the unique continuation equilibrium under
the balanced-budget ﬁscal policy.
15It is important to point out that even under the balanced-budget ﬁscal policy, future tax
decreases are taken into account in the agents’ decisions through their impact on the continuation







15unique equilibrium might seem a daunting task because there are so many alternative
t i m ep a t h st oc o n s i d e r . T h et i m ep a t ht h a ti sm o s tl i k e l yt om a k esl,1(zl,1) ≥ 0,
however, is the time path for which at every point in time newly matched pairs
create a productive relationship and no relationships choose to break up, that is,
the time path that converges directly to the low-unemployment steady state and
stays there. This is the time path that will lead to the largest possible reduction in
unemployment beneﬁts and tax burden and, thus, the largest increase in the surplus
values.
It is not diﬃcult to check whether this alternative time path is an equilibrium.
The assumption that all matches lead to productive relationships and no relation-
ships choose to break up imply a time path for the unemployment rate, output, and
the government’s obligations to pay unemployment beneﬁts. Under the balanced-
budget ﬁscal policy these imply a time path for the tax rates. Since the economy
moves to the low-unemployment steady state, the limiting continuation values under
the alternative time path are equal to the low-unemployment steady-state values.
One can then solve for the time path of the continuation values by assuming they
have attained the steady-state values for a large value of t and then iterate backwards
using Equations 5 through 10. Next we calculate the time path for the surplus val-
ues and if sl,t(zl,1) ≥ 0 for all t then the alternative time path is also an equilibrium
and staying in the high-unemployment steady state is not a unique equilibrium. The
procedure under the NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy is similar. The implied time path of
the government’s expenditures and output lead to a new constant tax rate. Since tax
rate are constant along the transition path, continuation values and surplus values
a r ec o n s t a n tt o o .A g a i n ,i ft h es u r p l u sv a l u ea tt h el o w e s tp r o d u c t i v i t yl e v e li sn o n -
negative then the alternative time path is an equilibrium under the NPV-balanced
ﬁscal policy.
In the framework considered in this paper it is not trivial to construct examples
in which (i) the discount factor is high, (ii) there are no destruction or creation costs,
(iii) the government implements the NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy, and (iv) staying in
the steady states is a unique continuation equilibrium. One might, therefore, be
tempted to conclude that steady states that are unique continuation equilibria are
implausible unless there are destruction or creation costs. Note, however, that under
the alternative time path the economy moves to the other steady state and stays
there forever.S i n c et h et r a n s i t i o ni sp e r m a n e n tt h ec h a n g ei nt h et a xb u r d e ni sh u g e ,
which makes it more likely that moving out of the steady state is an equilibrium
t i m ep a t h .I nr e a l i t y ,t h i sa l t e r n a t i v et i m ep a t hm a yn o tb et h a tr e a l i s t i ca n do n e
m a yw a n tt or u l et h e mo u ti nt h em o d e l . 16 T h i sw o u l dm a k ei tm o r el i k e l yt h a tt h e
16For example, by adding stochastic shocks to the model, which at some point will force the
economy out of the alternative steady state.
16steady state is a unique continuation equilibrium.
For the parameter values in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, the discount factor is low,
β =0 .8, there are no destruction or creation costs, and both steady state are unique
continuation equilibria under both passive ﬁscal policies. In the second column the
discount factor has a more realistic value, β =0 .98, both steady states are unique
continuation equilibria under the balanced-budget ﬁscal policy but not under the
NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy. In the third column the discount factor has again a
value equal to 0.98 and there are positive destruction and creation costs. Now both
steady states are unique continuation equilibria again under both types of passive
ﬁscal policy.
3.3 Using ﬁscal policy to eliminate high unemployment
In this subsection we ﬁrst discuss how the government can use debt management to
select the desirable equilibrium time path when staying in the high-unemployment
steady state is not the unique time path. Next, we show that if we allow productive
income to be taxed at diﬀerent rates, then ﬁscal policy can be used to even eliminate
the high-unemployment steady state.
3.3.1 Debt management and selecting the desirable time path
In the last subsection we showed that it is possible that staying in the high-unemployment
s t e a d ys t a t ei sn o tt h eu n i q u ec o n t i n u a t i o nt i m ep a t hif the government implements
an NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy. The question then arises whether the government
can use its ﬁscal policy to select the equilibrium time path that converges to the low-
unemployment equilibrium. In particular, suppose that the government announces
that from now on the tax rate will be equal to the (constant) level corresponding to
the time path along which the economy moves out of the high-unemployment steady
state. At this tax rate the surplus values for all productivity levels are positive, and
the government balances the present value of its revenues and expenditures. One
might be tempted to conclude that by committing to this tax rate the government
eliminates staying in the high-unemployment steady state as an equilibrium; the
only remaining equilibrium is to move towards the low-unemployment steady state.
Bassetto (2002) points out this establishes the uniqueness of an equilibrium but un-
der the assumption that the private sector believes that the government will act in
a way that is simply impossible under some scenarios. In particular, suppose that
the private sector does not believe that the economy will converge towards the low-
unemployment steady state. Under the assumption that the government commits
to a low tax rate, the present value of government expenditures and revenues are
17no longer equal. It is unclear what would happen under this scenario. It is possible
that the government would break its commitment. Since one cannot evaluate the
alternatives, one also cannot conclude there is not an equilibrium among the alter-
natives. An easy way out of this problem is to assume that the government commits
t oal o wt a xr a t eand that government expenditures, govt, will adjust to make the
net-present-value of the government’s budget deﬁcits equal to zero. It is easy to see
that with this modiﬁcation the time path along which the economy moves to the
low-unemployment steady state is the unique equilibrium. Note that in equilibrium
the government doesn’t have to adjust the level of government expenditures. It only
h a st od os oa l o n go ﬀ-equilibrium time paths.17
The point made by Bassetto (2002) may very well have important practical im-
plications. If the government “commits” to a time path of tax rates and government
expenditures then it is hard to predict what will happen when the expectations of
the private sector are such that even the NPV version of the government’s budget
constraint is not satisﬁed.
3.3.2 Using ﬁscal policy to eliminate the high-unemployment steady
state
The discussion above makes clear that this model does not imply Ricardian Equiva-
lence. The reason is that a decrease in the tax rate in the current period ﬁnanced by
an increase in a future tax rate may aﬀect diﬀerent people. For example, if you are
in a productive relationship today you will beneﬁt from the decrease in the current
tax rate but you care less about the future tax increase because you may either be
unemployed or retired. Similarly, the current unemployed beneﬁtl e s sf r o mt h ec u r -
rent decrease in the tax rate, which means a reduction in the outside option relative
to the beneﬁts of staying within the productive relationship. In fact, if the disutility
of working is equal to zero, i.e., bl = bh =0 , then a simple way to eliminate the
high-unemployment steady state is to make all tax rates equal to each other. In
this case an increase in tax rate would not aﬀect the values of the surplus and, thus,
destruction and rejection rates would remain unchanged.
If the surplus of the high productivity relationships is high enough, then the high-
unemployment steady-state can be eliminated by a transfer of funds from the high-
productivity relationships to the low-productivity relationships.18 That is, instead
of transferring funds from the productive relationships to the unemployed there
17Note that we also could make unemployment beneﬁts the residual in the government’s ﬁscal
policy.
18This could be in the form of letting the low-productivity relationships pay no or possibly less
taxes.
18would be transfers from the more productive to the less productive workers. A
suﬃcient condition for this to be a Pareto improvement is that bl <z l,1, since in
this case one has to transfer less than rl. However, a policy like this one that
subsidizes marginal jobs might not be politically feasible or desirable. First, it may
be diﬃcult to implement such a policy since what matters here is not the value of the
output produced or proﬁts but the value of the surplus. This may be hard for the
government to observe, that is, one may be taxing ﬁrms with a high level of revenues
or proﬁts but low surplus. Moreover, keeping marginal jobs alive may not always be
desirable in the long run. In this model, the fraction of high-productivity workers
is ﬁxed at φ but it may very well respond to market conditions. In this case, the
value of φ would increase over time if the economy suﬀers from high-unemployment,
for example, because education increases. The economy might eventually end up
in a low-unemployment regime but one with a higher fraction of high-productivity
workers.
4 Small and large temporary shocks
In this section we discuss how the economy can move out of a steady state in response
to temporary shocks. In the ﬁrst subsection we discuss shocks when the economy is
in the low-unemployment steady state to begin with and in the second subsection
the economy starts in the high-unemployment steady state.
4.1 Transitions out of the low-unemployment steady state
The aggregate fundamental shock considered here is a one-time change in the rate
of exogenous break ups. Although we think of this burst of destruction as being
caused by a one-time drop in productivity we don’t actually change productivity
levels which simpliﬁes the exposition. Note, however, that by keeping productivity
levels the same it is easier to remain in the low-unemployment steady state.
4.1.1 Small shocks
If the low-unemployment steady state is a unique continuation equilibrium then
the economy will converge back towards the low-unemployment steady state after
a small enough burst of destructions. This small shock will lead to an increased
obligation of the government to pay unemployment beneﬁts and necessarily leads to
an increase in tax rates at some point but the economy should be able to withstand
small enough shocks if the staying in the low-unemployment steady state is a unique
19continuation equilibrium.19
4.1.2 Large shocks
Clearly there are shocks large enough such that the economy will leave the low-
unemployment steady state. In particular, suppose that there is a one-time sharp re-
duction in the productivity level of the low-productivity relationships that is so large
that the values of the surplus of these relationships become negative. This means
that these relationships break up and the economy reaches the high-unemployment
steady state instantaneously. Since the high-unemployment steady state is a unique
continuation equilibrium, the belief that the economy will converge back to the low-
unemployment steady state is not going to prevent the economy from slipping to
this high-unemployment steady state. Moreover, because the high-unemployment
steady state is a unique continuation equilibrium, shocks that lead to unemploy-
ment rates close to the level of the high-unemployment regime cause an inevitable
transition to the high-unemployment steady state.
4.1.3 Intermediate shocks
A b o v ew es h o w e dt h a ti ft h es h o c ki ss m a l le n o u g ht h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mi st o
move back to the low-unemployment steady state, while if the shock is large enough
t h ee c o n o m yh a st om o v et ot h eh i g h - u n e m p l o y m e n ts t e a d ys t a t e .N o ts u r p r i s i n g l y ,
there are intermediate shocks for which expectations are not uniquely determined
and the economy could either move back towards the low-unemployment steady
state or move towards the high-unemployment steady state. In Figure 2 we have
plotted the possible time paths for the unemployment rate after a burst of destruc-
tion. The solid line represents the unemployment rate after the largest possible
burst of destruction after which return to the low-unemployment steady state is
still an equilibrium under the balanced-budget ﬁscal policy. In particular, if the
burst of destruction leads to an unemployment rate equal to 10.5% or less then
the economy can still move back to the low-unemployment regime.20 If the initial
unemployment rate is larger than 10.5% then the economy will have to move to the
h i g h - u n e m p l o y m e n tr e g i m e .T h ed a s h e dl i n er e p r e s e n t st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea f t e r
the smallest possible burst of destruction after which the economy could still move
19If staying in the low-unemployment steady state is a unique continuation equilibrium, then
the belief that the economy will move out of the steady sate−without a change in any of the
fundamentals−leads to a time path with sl,t(zl,1) > 0 at least for t =1 .C o n t i n u i t y o f sl,t(zl,1)
then guarantees that sl,t(zl,1) remains positive in response to a small change in the fundamentals.
20The procedure to check whether a time path is an equilibrium is the same as the one used to
check whether moving out of the steady state is an equilibrium.
20to the high-unemployment steady state under the same ﬁscal policy. In particular,
i ft h ei n i t i a lu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei se q u a lt o8 . 9 %o rm o r et h e nt h ee c o n o m yc o u l d
move to the high-unemployment regime. If the initial unemployment rate is less
than 8.9% the economy has to move back to the low-unemployment steady state.
Thus, if the initial unemployment is between 8.9% and 10.5% then the economy
could move to either steady state. It is important to note that these values are very
sensitive to changes in parameters such as bl. For example, if we would increase
the value of bl then breakup becomes more likely and the initial unemployment rate
for which the economy would have to move to the high-unemployment steady state
would be less than 10.5%.
When the government implements NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy then the range for
which the time path is indeterminate is between 8.6% and 11.7%. We see that the
indeterminate region under this ﬁscal policy is slightly larger. This is not surprising
since under this policy the government reinforces the agents’ expectations. That is,
if the agents’ expect the economy to return to the low-unemployment steady state
then the initial increase in tax rates will be bigger.
4.2 Transitions out of the high-unemployment steady state
Suppose the surplus of marginal jobs in the low-unemployment steady state, sl(zl,1),
is slightly positive. Then a small temporary negative shock might force the economy
to the high-unemployment steady state. If instead the surplus of marginal jobs in
the high-unemployment steady states is only slightly negative then a small positive
shock might push the economy to the low-unemployment equilibrium; the eﬀect of
temporary shocks in the two steady states doesn’t have to be symmetric.
There is no reason, however, why the absolute value of sl(zl,1) would be higher
in one of the steady states. Suppose, therefore that the absolute value of sl(zl,1)
is similar in both steady states. There are still reasons why the eﬀect of tempo-
rary shocks would not be symmetric. In particular, there are important reasons
w h yo n ew o u l de x p e c ti tt ob et y p i c a l l ym o r ed i ﬃcult to move out of the high-
unemployment steady state than out of the low-unemployment steady state. The
ﬁrst reason is the obvious fact of life that destruction can be quick, but restoration
unfortunately takes time. This asymmetry is ampliﬁed in this model by the eﬀect
of job destruction on tax rates. Since destruction is instantaneous and creation is
not, the tax increase corresponding to a period of negative shocks is larger than the
decrease corresponding to a period of positive shocks. Suppose the economy is in
the low-unemployment steady state and that a large aggregate shock destroys all
low-productivity relationships. Then the tax rate increases immediately from 29.9%
to 35.5% for both ﬁscal policies. Now suppose that the economy is in the high-
21unemployment steady state and the government implements NPV-balanced ﬁscal
policy. Consider the case where the rejection rate of all matched pairs is equal to
zero so that the economy will converge to the low-unemployment steady state. Since
the unemployment rate shrinks only gradually the tax rate decreases from 35.5% not
to 29.9% but to 33.2% for the parameters in the ﬁrst column of Table 1 and to and
30.7% for the parameters in the last two columns.
If productivity temporarily improves then only continuing relationships and
newly matched pairs can beneﬁt from this. If productivity is high for a long enough
time period, then eventually the unemployment rate will have been reduced enough
so that the economy can converge to the low-unemployment steady state even when
productivity returns to its normal value. Suppose the government balances the
budget period by period. After ten periods of positive shocks, during which all
new matches become productive relationship, the unemployment rate has decreased
enough so that the economy could converge to the low-unemployment steady state.21
If the government implements the balanced-NPV ﬁscal policy then the unemploy-
ment rate is already low enough after only one period.
5 European unemployment puzzle
In the ﬁrst subsection we document the time series behavior of unemployment, public
expenditures on unemployment compensation and labor market programs, tax rates,
and replacement rates for several European countries and the United States. We
argue that the analysis in the earlier sections can be used to explain the observed
behavior of European unemployment rates. In the second subsection we argue that
current European ﬁscal policies may sustain high unemployment rates.
5.1 The role of taxes and unemployment beneﬁts
In this paper, we have incorporated a fairly standard model with multiple equilibria
into a dynamic framework and shown that in this dynamic context the equilibrium
time path may be uniquely determined by past realizations of the fundamental shock.
That is, if the shocks were large enough then the unemployment rate has become
so large that the transition to the other regime is unavoidable. This story ﬁts the
experience of European unemployment well. The idea is that Europe started in the
low-unemployment steady-state in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Even though replacement
rates were high, they did not result in high tax rates because the unemployment
rate was low. The recession in the 1970’s increased the government’s obligation
21These numbers are for the parameter values in the third column of Table 1.
22to pay unemployment beneﬁts. Because of the corresponding increase in the tax
burden the economy could only converge towards the high-unemployment regime.
T h em o d e lp r e d i c t st h a ta l o n gt h i st i m ep a t ht ot h eh i g h - u n e m p l o y m e n tr e g i m et a x
rates should increase, both because of an increase in the amount of transfers to the
unemployed and because of a decrease in aggregate productive income. We now
show that this explains the data fairly well.
Standardized unemployment rates for Europe22 and the U.S. are plotted in Figure
3. As documented by the ﬁgure, the unemployment rates in Europe and the U.S.
were low and fairly similar in the beginning of the sample. During the 1970’s,
European unemployment rates rose sharply and just when it seemed they might
be leveling oﬀ they experienced another rapid increase from which they still haven’t
fully recovered. Unemployment rates in the U.S. in contrast, reached unemployment
rates in the second half of the 1990’s that were close to their all time lows.
The model in this paper shows that a large negative temporary shock can have a
permanent eﬀect on unemployment rates if it interacts with employment-unfriendly
institutions. An important example of such an institution is the presence of high
net replacement rates. In Table 3 we report net replacement rates for unemployed
workers in several countries. The table documents that in most European countries
net replacement rates are substantial relative to U.S. replacement rates. This gap
cannot explain the high unemployment rates in Europe relative to the U.S., however,
because European replacement rates were already high relative to U.S. levels at the
beginning of the postwar period when unemployment rates were similar.23
T h ew e d g eb e t w e e nt a xr a t e so np r o d u c t i v ei n c o m ea n du n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts
plays an important role in this paper. To illustrate the magnitude of this wedge
we report in Table 4 average eﬀective tax rates on labor income and unemployment
beneﬁts from Daveri and Tabellini (2000). The table shows that in all countries
there are substantial diﬀerences in the eﬀective tax rates. The tax rate on labor
income averaged across European countries is equal to 35.8% while the average tax
rate on unemployment beneﬁts is equal to only 16.2%. The ﬁndings in this table
correspond roughly to our assumption that the tax rate on unemployment beneﬁts
is equal to four tenths of the tax rate on productive income. We calibrated the
tax rate in the low-unemployment steady state to be equal to 30%, which is the
overall tax burden as a percentage of GDP over the period from 1966 to 1970 across
European countries.24 T h i st a xr a t ei si nt h er a n g eo fo b s e r v e de ﬀective labor tax
rates for European countries.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 5 we report the amount spent on unemployment
22The countries included are the ﬁfteen members of the European Union.
23See, for example, Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2002).
24See Table 7 below.
23beneﬁts and in the second column total transfers to the working-age population,
both as a percentage of GDP. The numbers on unemployment compensation in the
ﬁrst column of Table 5 should be considered as a lower bound on the total amount of
income transfers paid because of labor market conditions to working-age individuals.
One reason is that some unemployed are misclassiﬁed as sick or disabled25 and
their compensation should be counted as part of the unemployment beneﬁts paid
out. The reported numbers on total transfers to the working-age population include
government expenditures such as expenses on housing beneﬁts, family beneﬁts, and
early retirement that beneﬁt the unemployed and are also related to labor market
conditions. Of course, they also include transfers to the truly sick and disabled that
are not directly aﬀected by market conditions.
Moreover, transfers are not the only government expenditures that are related
to labor market conditions. Examples are expenditures on labor market training,
subsidized employment public, and employment services and administration. The
amount spent on these type of government programs is not necessarily small.26 For
example, in 1995 Denmark spent 1.0 per cent of GDP on labor market training
programs and 0.58 per cent of GDP on subsidized employment programs. Sweden
spent in 1994-95 0.78 per cent of GDP on labor market training programmes and
0.90 per cent of GDP on subsidized employment.
These numbers suggest that it is not unreasonable to argue that the higher
unemployment rates in Europe corresponds to labor-market-related transfers that,
as a per cent of GDP, are at least several points higher than their U.S. equivalents.
Using only actual unemployment compensation transfers Saunders and Klau
(1985) report how much the ratio of unemployment beneﬁts to GDP has changed
over the period from 1970 to 1981, which should be a good estimate of the change
in total transfers from the low-unemployment period to the high-unemployment
period. The results are reproduced in Table 6. The average increase of this ratio
across European countries is equal to 4.51 percentage points. As documented in
T a b l e2 ,t h em o d e li sc o n s e r v a t i v ei nt h a ti tp r e d i c t sa ni n c r e a s eo f3 . 7 6p e r c e n t a g e
points. Note that part of the observed increase is due to an increase in beneﬁts
levels27 and this is not taken into account in the model. To look at the implications
for taxes we report in Table 7 the overall tax burden for the following three sub-
periods: 1966-1970, 1971-1975, and 1976-1982. Note that the tax rate generated by
the model in the low-unemployment steady state closely matches the average tax
burden for the sample period from 1966 to 1970.28 The increase in the tax burden
25See, for example, Nickell and van Ours (2000).
26See Table T in the statistical annex of OECD (1996).
27See Table 35 in Saunders and Klau (1985).
28This is accomplished by setting gov equal to 0.32, which corresponds to a level of government
24predicted by the model of 5.6 percentage points covers a big part of the observed
increase of 6.9 percentage points.
To assess the quantitative eﬀects of tax rates on the economy, the following as-
pects are important to keep in mind. Creation of new jobs clearly plays an important
role for the performance of an economy. That new jobs have a low surplus value
seems very plausible. As demonstrated by the numerical examples above, relatively
small changes in tax rates can have a big impact on the economy under these cir-
cumstances. Several other features that are not present in the model may aggravate
the eﬀect of tax rates. Note the matching process is the only friction in the model.
For example, in this model there is always demand for the commodities supplied.29
The fact that demand for a new product (or an increase in supply) might be uncer-
tain is an extra reason why the surplus level of new projects (or additional workers)
may be very low. Also, because agents are assumed to be risk neutral there are no
changes in the interest rate. Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000a) show that ﬂuc-
tuations in the interest rate serve as an important magniﬁcation and propagation
mechanism in a job matching model with capital. To see this, suppose a burst of
destruction leads to a reduction in consumption. The desire to smooth consump-
tion will increase interest rates.30 The increase in interest rates increases the cost of
capital which in turn will increase the number of relationships destroyed. The desire
to smooth consumption will lead to a reduction in the capital stock which in turn
will put upward pressure on future interest rates and lead to more destruction in
future periods. Finally, besides the externality associated with unemployment ben-
eﬁts and tax burdens, the presence of low-productivity relationships may generate
other externalities in the economy. For example, the disappearance of service jobs
like the home delivery of groceries would increase the costs of working and, thus,
decrease the surplus of other jobs. Finally, if jobs remain unﬁlled for long periods
of time networks aﬀecting the eﬃciency of the matching market may deteriorate or
disappear, which in turn may make it more diﬃcult for these jobs to ever become
productive again.
More empirical evidence for the view in this paper that the increase in total
unemployment beneﬁts paid out had a negative eﬀe c to ne c o n o m i ca c t i v i t yc a nb e
found in Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli (2002). Using an econometric
panel analysis on a OECD panel data set, they document a sizable negative eﬀect
of public spending on business investment. In particular, they ﬁnd that a one
percentage point increase in transfers as a fraction of GDP decreases investment -
as a share of GDP- with 0.21% on impact and with a cumulative eﬀect of 1.25%
expenditures equal to 28% of GDP.
29Basically because agents eat their own production.
30Relative to what interest rates would do without the consumption-smoothing motive.
25over ten years.
5.2 Current ﬁscal policy
The model suggests that after a burst of destruction there are two possibilities. The
ﬁrst is that even if the government uses deﬁcit management in an optimal way the
economy will converge and stay in the high-unemployment regime unless the gov-
ernment conducts a complete overhaul of the transfer system, including subsidies to
marginal jobs. Secondly, a commitment to low tax rates could prevent the economy
from moving to the high-unemployment regime and instead force the economy back
to the low-unemployment regime. In some cases, this policy could even work after
the economy has reached the high-unemployment regime. To ﬁgure out which case
is relevant for an actual economy would require some detailed research to determine
the surplus values of new potential jobs. This may not be that easy since what
really matters is the question how a reduction in tax rates aﬀects those jobs that
are under the current regime of high tax rates have a negative surplus and, thus, do
not exist.
After the Maastricht Treaty, European governments have put a lot of emphasis
on deﬁcit reduction. This paper suggests that by doing so they may have given up a
remedy against high unemployment rates. That is, by committing to an environment
with low taxes the government could very well drive unemployment rates lower.
Although this policy would lead to temporary increases in the budget deﬁcit it would
in the long run lead to a reduction in the government’s transfers to the unemployed
and an increase in the tax base. The analysis here as well as in Bassetto (2002)
makes clear that under this policy the government has to be committed to the tax
reduction, which means that taxes cannot be the residual instrument used to balance
the budget. That is, true commitment requires a clear plan that describes which
expenditures will be cut if the private sector is not convinced that the economy will
converge towards the low-unemployment equilibrium.
6 Concluding Comments
In this paper we developed a dynamic framework with multiple steady states in
which equilibrium selection is not controlled by the realization of a sunspot variable
but in which time paths are determined by the realizations of past shocks. In the
benchmark model we have the following results. After large temporary shocks the
economy can only move to the high-unemployment equilibrium while after small
shocks the economy can only move towards the low-unemployment equilibrium.
Time paths are not always uniquely determined, however. For intermediate shocks,
26the economy could move either to the low or the high-unemployment equilibrium
and expectations of the private sector would be self-fulﬁlling. The idea is that the
unemployment rate, or more generally the implied tax burden, is a state variable
that controls the solution to the model. In this aspect the model is similar to
D e nH a a n ,R a m e y ,a n dW a t s o n( 2 0 0 2 )i nw h i c hl a r g ee n o u g hd e s t r u c t i o n st ot h e
network between entrepreneurs and ﬁnancial intermediaries reduce the eﬃciency of
the intermediation process to such an extent that the economy faces an unavoidable
collapse.
Fiscal policy plays a key role in this paper and we have shown that ﬁscal policy
can be used to (i) make the transition to the low-unemployment steady state an
alternative equilibrium when moving to (or staying in) the high-steady state is an
equilibrium time path if the government uses a NPV-balanced ﬁscal policy, and (ii)
select transition to the low-unemployment steady state as the unique equilibrium
if the government commits to low tax rates and is willing to adjust government
expenditures under oﬀ-equilibrium time paths.
In spirit this paper this paper is similar to Daveri and Tabellini (2000) who also
a r g u et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt a xr a t e sp l a ya ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nt h ei n c r e a s ei nE u r o p e a n
unemployment rates. In Daveri and Tabellini (2000), however, the increase in tax
rates is exogenous while here the increase is an endogenous response to temporary
shocks. An interesting aspect of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) that is missing in
this paper is the theoretical and empirical analysis that shows that the increase in
tax rates not only aﬀects unemployment rates but also growth rates. It would be
interesting to extend the framework here and to model the eﬀect of tax rates on
growth rates along the lines used in, for example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) or
Novales and Ruiz (2002). This would not only increase the range of predictions made
by the model but can also magnify the eﬀects of temporary shocks by including the
eﬀect of tax rates on real activity through economic growth.
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Table 1: Parameter Values 





 cre = ζ
 des = 0  ζ
 cre = ζ
 des = 0  ζ
 cre,ζ
 des > 0 
β   0.8 0.98  0.98 
ζ
 cre  0 0  0.30 
ζ
 des  0 0  0.55 
bl = bh  0.2425 0.2620  0.2550 
rl = rh  .5 =  = 
zl,1  1.00 =  = 
zl,2  1.065 =  = 
zh  1.2 = = 
ρ
 x  0.01 =  = 
ρ
 r  0.01 =  = 
p
 n(zl,1)  1 =  = 
p(zl,2|zl,1)  0.4 = = 
p(zl,1|zl,2)  0 =  = 
λ l  0.1 = = 
λ h  0.5 = = 
φ   0.9 = = 
ψ   0.4 = = 
gov  0.32 =  = 
Note: An equality sign in this table indicates that the parameter has a value equal to the 
value reported in the first column. 
 






unemployment rate    4.7%  13.5% 
tax rate  29.9%  35.5% 
total transfers / output  1.81%  5.57% 
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Table 3: 1994/1995 Net replacement rates 











Note: The numbers are from Table 2 in Martin (1996) 
and represent an overall average across beneficiaries 
with different family circumstances for the first five 
years of unemployment. They are expressed as a 
percentage of the pre-displacement wage. 
 
 







Belgium 39.2  27.3  11.9 
France  39.8  31.0    8.8 
Germany  36.3    8.0  28.3 
Italy 34.0    -4.4  38.4 
Netherlands 44.6 29.7  14.9 
Norway 37.0  20.8  16.2 
Spain  24.8  16.2    8.6 
Sweden 42.2  15.8  26.4 
U.K.  24.2    1.2  22.9 
Europe (average)  35.8  16.2  18.0 
U.S.  24.1    0.8  23.3 
Note: These numbers are from Table 3 in Daveri and Tabellini (2000). 
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Belgium  2.2    8.7 
Denmark 3.6  11.9 
France  1.6    7.0 
Germany  1.5    6.0 
Ireland  3.2    7.9 
Italy  0.7    3.7 
Netherlands 2.8  12.7 
Norway  1.4    9.9 
Spain  3.2    6.7 
Sweden 2.6  11.7 
U.K.  1.2    8.1 
U.S.  0.7    3.2 
Note: Numbers are from Tables 1 and 2 in MacFarlan and Oxley (1996) and are 
expressed as percentage of GDP. 
 
 
Table 6: Change in ratio of unemployment compensation to GDP, 1970-1981 







United Kingdom  2.92 
Europe (average)  4.51 
United States  1.26 
Note: These numbers are from Table 35 in Saunders and Klau (1985). In addition 
to the U.S., only those European countries are included for which data are based 
on the complete sample. 
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Table 7: Overall tax burden as percentage of GDP 
  1966-70 1971-75 1976-82 
Austria 24.6  26.9  29.9 
Belgium 34.6  38.6  44.8 
Denmark 35.5  42.9  43.7 
Finland 32.0  34.4  37.1 
France 35.4  36.0  41.2 
Germany 32.7  35.4  37.1 
Greece 23.7  24.2  28.6 
Ireland 29.4  31.6  35.7 
Italy 28.0  28.2  33.6 
Luxembourg 30.0  34.0  39.9 
Netherlands 36.7  41.5  44.7 
Norway 37.4  44.4  47.0 
Portugal 20.5  22.9  28.3 
Spain 16.3  18.5  23.1 
Sweden 39.0  42.4  50.0 
Switzerland 22.6  26.1  31.1 
U.K. 34.6  34.3  35.7 
Europe (average)  30.2  33.1  37.1 
U.S. 28.3  29.2  30.1 
Note: These numbers are from Table 56 in Saunders and Klau (1985).    34
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Note: The solid line gives the time path of the unemployment rate for the worst possible shock after which 
the economy could still move back to the low-unemployment steady state and the dashed line gives the time 
path of the unemployment rate after the smallest possible shock that is bad enough to make convergence to 
the high-unemployment steady state a possibility, both under the balanced-budget fiscal policy. The thin 
double arrow indicates the range of values of the initial unemployment rates for which the economy could 










































Note: The unemployment rate for Europe is an average of the 15 member countries of the European 








1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
U.S.
Europe